Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

State of Utah v. Thomas W. Schnoor : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Robert L. Steele; Attorneys for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Kris Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Schnoor, No. 900330 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2721

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 900330-CA

v.
Priority No. 2
THOMAS W. SCHNOOR,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF
FORGERY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (1990), IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
MICHAEL R. MURPHY, PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KRIS LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

JOAN C. WATT
ROBERT L. STEELE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

AU8111992

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 900330-CA

v.
Priority No. 2
THOMAS W. SCHNOOR,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF
FORGERY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (1990), IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
MICHAEL R. MURPHY, PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KRIS LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

JOAN C. WATT
ROBERT L. STEELE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TAB!,!' OF AUTHOR IT 1 KM

•**

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
. . . . . . .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

,
L>

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CHALLENGED TESTIMONY WAS TRUE AND
FOSTERED NO FALSE IMPRESSION; ALTERNATIVELY,
EVEN IF A FALSE IMPRESSION WAS GENERATED BY
THE EXCHANGE, IT DID NOT AFFECT THE JUDGMENT
OF THE JURY AND, HENCE, DOES NOT WARRANT
REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTION

9

POINT I I
DEFENDANT WAIVED REVIEW OF THE PROSECUTOR'S
CLOSING REMARKS; ALTERNATIVELY, THE REMARKS
WERE NEITHER IMPROPER NOR PREJUDICIAL AND
WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PROPER CLOSING
ARGUMENT
POINT III ANY ERROR IN THE STATE'S CROSS-EXAMINATION i '
DEFENDANT CONCERNING ANOTHER WITNESS'
VERACITY WAS HARMLESS WHERE DEFENDANT
SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE AND THE COURT SUSTAINED
DEFENDANT'S TIMELY OBJECTIONS
POINT IV

THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE BECAUSE NO
MULTIPLE, SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE COMMITTED
BELOW

41
A ->

CONCLUSION.
ADDENDA

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Pankratz v. State. 663 P.2d 26 (Okl. Cr. 1983)

38

People v. Best. 424 N.E.2d 29 (111. App. 1981)

37, 38

State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986)
State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981)

30, 31, 34
22

State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989)

17, 26

State v. Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d 74 (Wash.
App. 1991)

38, 39

State v. Cowan. 26 Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890
(1971)
State v. Dav. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991)

23
26, 31, 38

State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989)

28

State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)

10

State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert.
denied. 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989)
State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987)
State v. Emmett. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah
April 7, 1992)
State v. Flanagan. 801 P.2d 675 (N.M. App.),
cert, denied. 801 P.2d 659 (N.M. 1990)
State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)
State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)
State v. Hales. 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982)

41
3, 41
3, 37, 41
37, 38, 39
2, 17, 18, 27
38
28, 39

State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)

2, 3, 28, 29

State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1991)

22

State v. Hodges. 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322
(1974)
ii

21, 40

State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1990). . 2, 3, 28, 29, 39
State v. Jarrell. 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980)

1, 18

State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551 (Utah 1991)

10

State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989)

41

State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991)

17

State v. Kotz. 758 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1988)

21

State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook, 949
F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied.
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992)

29

State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987)
State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991)
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1991)
State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)
State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976)
State v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984)

3, 29
17, 21
17
21, 22
3, 41
21
29, 31
1, 10, 18

State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) . . . . 16, 28, 29, 31, 32,
34
State v. Tavlor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991)

26

State v. Temolin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)

17

State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

31, 35

State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)

30, 34

State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989),
cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018, 110 S. Ct. 1323
(1990)
State v. Valdez. 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422
(1973)
State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978)
iii

3, 38
3, 29, 31, 35
40

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
Ct. 2052 (1984)

17

Walker v. State. 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981)

1, 10, 18-21

West Valley City v. Rislow. 736 P.2d 637 (Utah
App. 1987)

. 33

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990)

1, 3, 4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992)

. 1

Utah R. Crim. P. 30

3, 35, 38

Utah R. Crim. P. 19

21, 35

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

THOMAS W. SCHNOOR,

:

Case No. 900330-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of
forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-501 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy,
presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. (a) Did the prosecution breach a duty to clarify an
allegedly false impression arising from defendant's crossexamination of one of the State's witnesses?

This Court must

determine whether false testimony or a false impression existed
below and will not disturb the conviction absent "a reasonable
likelihood the false impression . • • could have affected the
judgment of the jury."

Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690-91

(Utah 1981); see also State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 789 (Utah
1984); State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980),

(b) Was the allegedly false impression improperly
fostered by the giving of jury instruction number 7 relating to
defendant's status as a party to the offense?

No standard of

review is presented for this issue because defendant failed to
preserve the issue for appellate review.
(c)

In the alternative, was defendant denied effective

assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's failure to 1) enter
into the trial record evidence establishing the State's verbal
commitment made at the preliminary hearing, and 2) make a record
of objections to jury instructions made at unrecorded bench
conferences at trial?

Because this issue was not raised at the

district court, there is no order to review.

Instead, this Court

must determine whether counsel's performance was deficient and,
if so, whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant
under the test set forth in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405
(Utah 1986).
2.

Did the prosecutor's statements during trial and in

closing argument deny defendant a fair trial?

This Court may

reverse a conviction only if the prosecutor's statements are
improper and prejudicial.

State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 786

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v.
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990)•

When reviewing an

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must determine
whether counsel's statements "call[ed] to the attention of the
jurors matters which they could not properly consider in
determining their verdict", and whether the error was
2

"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that without the error the result would have been more
favorable for the defendant-"

Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925; see

also Harrison, 805 P.2d at 786; State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45
(Utah App. 1990); State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d
422, 426 (1973).
3.

Did the prosecutor's limited inquiry into

defendant's opinion as to the veracity of another witness at
trial prejudice defendant?

Although the questions may be deemed

improper, see State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah
April 7, 1992), this Court should not disturb the conviction
unless it determines that there is "a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result" absent the questioning.

State v. Tuttle,

780 P.2d 1203, 1213 n.l (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018,
110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); Utah R. Evid. 103; Utah R. Crim. P. 30.
4.

Is defendant entitled to reversal of his conviction

based on the aggregate of the alleged errors if none of the
individual allegations of error warrant reversal?

This Court

will not apply the cumulative error doctrine unless it finds that
multiple, substantial errors were committed below.

State v.

Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d
498, 501-02 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990):
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
•

• •
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(b) Makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes,
or utters any writing so that the writing or
the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference,
publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have
been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the
case, or to be a copy of an original when no
such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing"includes
printing or any other method of recording information,
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value,
right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if
the writing is or purports to be:
•

• •

(b) A check with a face amount of $100
or more . . . .
The text of other relevant constitutional, statutory,
or rule provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 21, 1990, defendant Thomas W. Schnoor was
charged with forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. 6). 1 Schnoor pled not
guilty (R. 16), and trial was set for May 1, 1990 (R. 16). The
jury found Schnoor guilty as charged (R. 27; Tr. at 219-20), and
1

Citations herein to the record on appeal are as follows:
Court's Record
Preliminary Hearing Transcript
Trial Transcript

R. (page)
P.H. at (page)
Tr. at (page).

Pages 48 through 53 of the trial transcript are out of order and
may be found between pages 92 and 93 in the transcript.

the court sentenced him to serve an indeterminate term of one to
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 76, 77). Schnoor
filed his notice of appeal on the day of sentencing (R. 78).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During January, 1990, defendant Thomas W. Schnoor
resided with his ex-wife and their two children in an apartment
in Salt Lake City (Tr. at 158-60, 167). He was also romantically
involved with the mother of Brent and Brenda Lindsey, sixteenyear-old fraternal twins (Tr. at 18, 40, 65-66, 157-58).

Early

on January 25, 1990, defendant called Brent, asked him if he
wanted to earn $ 50.00, and told him he could not tell anybody
what he was going to do (Tr. at 19-21).

Brent agreed and

defendant arranged to pick him up at work that afternoon (Tr. at
21).

Around 2:00 p.m., defendant picked up Brenda so she could

show him where Brent worked, and the two picked up Brent (Tr. at
19, 21, 67-70).

Defendant gave Brent a paycheck drawn on the

account of defendant's employer, Huish Detergents, and made
payable to Robert B. Saupe (Tr. at 22-24, 147-48, 157; State's
Exhibit 1). Defendant directed Brent to memorize the name so he
could try to cash the check (Tr. at 22-26, 72). The trio went to
Mike's Pawn, a pawn shop frequented by defendant and owned by
Jack Lords (Tr. at 26, 124, 152, 169). Defendant repurchased his
television and took it to his car while Brent attempted to cash
the check at another counter (Tr. at 26-27, 51-55, 153, 169-71).
When Lords required an indorsement on the check, Brent, who
suffers a learning disability, misspelled "Saupe" (Tr. at 26-27,
5

43, 48-51, 53-54).

Lords refused to cash the check, and Brent

followed defendant out of the shop (Tr. at 26-27, 53-54, 73-74).
Defendant drove the Lindseys to their apartment and
made two phone calls, each time asking if the establishment on
the other end cashed checks (Tr. at 28-33, 75-77, 153-54, 17881).

He asked Brenda to get him a pair of scissors which he used

to cut off the end of the check on which the misspelled
indorsement appeared (Tr. at 33-34, 56-57, 75-79).

He then drove

Brent and Brenda to "Cash-A-Check", stopping across the street to
let Brent out (Tr. at 34-35, 55, 79). Defendant gave Brent the
check, told him what to do, and admonished him not to mention
defendant's name, his description, or where he was parked should
there be a problem (Tr. at 35-36, 79-80).

Because Brent had no

identification, the store's manager required that he fill out an
information sheet (Tr. at 36-37, 109). He again misspelled the
name of the payee, provided some general information, and left
the majority of the document blank (Tr. at 110-11; State's
Exhibit 2). The manager went to the back room, phoned Huish
Detergents for verification, spoke with Robert Saupe, discovered
that the check had been reported missing, and then called the
police, who arrived minutes later and arrested Brent (Tr. at 37,
111, 114, 119-20).

Defendant and Brenda drove away when the

police arrived (Tr. at 80).

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Brent Lindsey's responses to defendant's inquiries
concerning an alleged grant of immunity were accurate, were fully
supported by the preliminary hearing transcript, and were not
otherwise proven to be false.

Further, the exchange created no

false impression affecting the jury's credibility determination.
Accordingly, the State had no duty to "correct" the accurate
testimony, and defense counsel's failure to introduce the
preliminary hearing testimony to clarify the impression did not
constitute deficient performance.

Alternatively, any false

impression which may have been generated by the exchange was
invited by defendant and was not reasonably likely to have
affected the jury's judgment.

Any possible prejudice stemming

from the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's examination
of Brent was adequately mitigated by the court's ruling and
subsequent instruction to the jury.

The prosecutor's statements

in his closing remarks to the jury were within the scope of
proper closing argument and did not foster the allegedly false
impression.
below.

Any objection to instruction number 7 was waived

Defendant's assertion that the impression affected the

jury's judgment by impacting on its credibility assessment is
unpersuasive given the evidence at trial relating to credibility
and guilt together with the reasonable inference therefrom
contrary to the impression challenged on appeal and affirmatively
argued by defendant to the jury.

Accordingly, defense counsel's

failure to correct the allegedly false impression was not so

7

prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the reliability of the
verdict.
Defendant failed to preserve all but one of his
challenges to the prosecutor's closing remarks by registering no
objections, registering inadequate objections, or failing to
request clarifying instructions below.

Even on the merits, none

of the prosecutor's remarks warrant reversal of defendant's
conviction because he did not bring to the jury's attention
matters which they could not consider in reaching their decision,
and defendant suffered no prejudice in light of the circumstances
and the evidence in this case.
Defendant waived appellate review of the prosecutor's
initial question to him at trial regarding the veracity of
another witness, and any impropriety in the remaining questions
was harmless where the actions of both the court and defendant
mitigated any potential prejudice.
The aggregate of the alleged errors does not warrant
reversal of defendant's conviction because defendant waived most
of the alleged errors below, and any remaining error constitutes
at most harmless error.

Therefore, the cumulative error doctrine

does not apply.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CHALLENGED TESTIMONY WAS TRUE AND
FOSTERED NO FALSE IMPRESSION; ALTERNATIVELY,
EVEN IF A FALSE IMPRESSION WAS GENERATED BY
THE EXCHANGE, IT DID NOT AFFECT THE JUDGMENT
OF THE JURY AND, HENCE, DOES NOT WARRANT
REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTION
Defendant contends that Brent Lindsey, the State's
first witness at trial, gave false testimony in response to
defendant's cross-examination.

He asserts that the testimony

generated a false impression which was fostered by jury
instruction number 7, the prosecutor's failure to correct the
testimony, and the prosecutor's alleged misconduct in actively
arguing the claimed impression in his closing remarks.

Defendant

contends that the false impression prejudicially tainted the
credibility determination underlying the verdict, thereby
requiring reversal of his conviction.

In the alternative, he

contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
make the preliminary hearing events and his objections to
instruction number 7 below part of the trial record (Brief of
Appellant at 14-15).

However, reversal is not warranted because

the challenged testimony at trial was fully consistent with that
rendered at the preliminary hearing, it did not foster any false
impression, and there is no reasonable likelihood that it
affected the jury's judgment.

9

A.

The Challenged Trial Testimony was True and Fostered no False

Impression
Defendant contends that Brent gave "incorrect
testimony" which fostered a false impression "that Brent was
testifying in spite of the effect that it may have on his own
trial" (Brief of Appellant at 12). However, Brent's responses to
defendant's cross-examination regarding immunity were truthful
and accurate and generated no false impression.
The knowing use of false evidence to obtain a
conviction is a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
1981).2

Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah

If false testimony is given or a false impression is

generated and the State knows it to be false, the State has a
duty to correct it, whether or not it was solicited by the State.
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 789 (Utah 1984) (citing Walker,
624 P.2d at 690). However, the duty arises only upon the State's
knowing use of false evidence.
624 P.2d at 690-91.

Shabata, 678 P.2d at 789; Walker,

Because the challenged testimony in this

case is not false and did not generate a false impression, the
State had no duty to act.
The "immunity" which defendant claims was granted by
the State to Brent at the preliminary hearing was a verbal
2

Although he claims a violation of both the state and federal
constitutions (Brief of Appellant at 11), defendant claims no
broader protection under the state constitution and provides no
separate analysis for the state claim. Hence, this court need not
conduct a separate analysis under the state constitution. State v.
Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 n.2 (Utah 1991); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d
803, 805-06 (Utah 1986).
10

"commitment" to not file future charges against Brent and was not
given to obtain Brent's testimony.

The commitment was elicited

by the preliminary hearing court in response to defendant's
voiced concerns:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINDSTAFF]: Your Honor, therethere 's one matter I might address the Court on. It's
my—looking at the police report, it appears that Mr.
Lindsey is identified as a suspect and there's been a
juvenile referral on this particular case. And I don't
think that it's appropriate that—that we—I give him
legal advice, or even the Court; but if he testifies,
what he says may incriminate himself.
(P.H. at 3). Both the court and the prosecutor questioned Brent
to determine the extent of his involvement with the Juvenile
Court.

Defense counsel then conducted his voir dire of the

witness, closing his questioning with the following:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL].
immunity—
[BRENT LINDSEY].

Have you been granted

No.

Q. —from charges? You have no written—nothing
in writing or no promises made that you wouldn't be
charged in the future?
A.

No.

THE COURT: I don't see any problem in going ahead
with this witness at this point.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Two problems, one i s —
obviously, we can't give him advice but—we're not his
attorney, but potentially, looking at the —
THE COURT: Well, let me ask, is it the intention
of the State to charge this defendant in Juvenile
Court?
[PROSECUTOR VERHOEF]: It's my understanding,
Detective Mossier has just informed me that the charges
were once filed in Juvenile Court but have been
dismissed; isn't that right?
11

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. And are you making a commitment
now on behalf of the State that you're not going to
file charges against the defendant in Juvenile Court
based on this incident?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, I will, your Honor. For the
record, the State will not charge this young man with
the crime.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Even if the State makes a
statement on the record, the—the only grant of
immunity that's valid under the statute's a written
grant signed by the County Attorney himself, and again,
I think that before—
THE COURT:
than that?

Do you have any other problem, other

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — w e go forward, I think that
he should probably [have] someone—if he has an
attorney, I think if he doesn't, I think one should be
appointed.
THE COURT: I don't see a problem at this point.
I'm certainly going to hold the County Attorney to it,
to the comment and commitment that's been made. I
realize what you've said, under the statute, is
correct, it's legally correct; but obviously, the
County Attorney's Office is going to be hard-pressed to
bring any action out at the Juvenile Court based on the
statements [sic] that's been made by the Deputy County
Attorney.
So at this point, I'll allow him to go forward
with the examination of the witness. You've made your
record.
(P.H. at 4-8; see Addendum A, attached).

The State received no

evidence as a result of its commitment at the preliminary hearing
where Brent's testimony was already available to the State in the
form of his earlier confession to the police (P.H. at 14)
rendered without the use of promises or exchanges (P.H. at 7, 2425).

12

Based on the exchange at the preliminary hearing,
defendant contends that the following trial testimony, elicited
by defendant on cross-examination of Brent, was false (Brief of
Appellant at 7-14):
[DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINDSTAFF]•
tried to forge a check; right?
[BRENT LINDSEY].

Now, you admit you

Yes.

Q. And you were promised you wouldn't go to jail,
right, if you came and testified against [defendant]?
A.

If I what? —

I don't get it.

Q.

Weren't there promises made to you?

A.

No.

Q. No? Have you been charged with the crime?
Have you had to go to the detention center?
A.

No.

Q.

That was right after you were arrested; right?

A.

A few weeks —

Q.

About a week later you went to court; right?

A.

Yes.

A.

Well, it's not really court.

A [sic].

Oh, yes, once.

about a week later.

It was —

You went and met with police officers?

A.

I don't know if it was a police officer.

Q.

Probation officer?

A.

I think that's what it was.

From the juvenile system?

Q. Did they promise you that if you testified
against [defendant], they wouldn't press any charges
against you?
A.

No.

No, they didn't.

Q,

Have they pressed charges against you?
13

[PROSECUTOR MORGAN]: We are proceeding in bad
faith. At this point all of that has been answered .
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
that question.
THE COURT:

He can answer that question.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL].
pressed against you?
A.

I don't believe he's answered

Have there been charges

Urn, no.

Q. No. And why haven't there been charges
pressed against you?
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. Beyond the personal
knowledge of the witness. As phrased.
THE COURT:
know.
A.

You can answer the question, if you

I don't know. .

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. You don't know whether or not
you haven't be [sic] charged because of your testimony
in this case?
A.

Yes.

I don't know. .

Q. You don't know. Your [sic] were in court for
a preliminary hearing, weren't you? And didn't you
hear the prosecutor represent to you that they would
not file charges against you? For your testimony?
A.

I can't remember.

Q.

Isn't that what happened?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, your Honor.
approach the bench?
THE COURT:

May we

You may.

(Bench conference off the record.) • •
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. Now, have you been told that
if you didn't testimony [sic] that you would go to
jail?
A.

No.
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Q. No? About a month and a half ago, wasn't it
true that you and your sister sat in a room with a
police officer and you two were told that if you didn't
come over and testify against Tom —
[PROSECUTOR]. Objection. This is getting
argumentative and — I mean, he's asked — each time
the the [sic] witness has answered each time that he
has not been offered anything in this case. Now we are
going through testimony, I think, that is going way
collateral to any issues here.
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the
objection on the presumption that a the [sic] question
is asked i[n] good faith.
Members of the jury, you remember when the jury
selection process was going on, and I indicated to you
that what counsel says is not evidence. The only
evidence is what witnesses say. The mere fact that a
question is asked in such a way that it may sound like
a statement from counsel, is that is not evidence, and
I caution you to consider that as we proceed.
(Tr. at 43-46; see Addendum A, attached).
A review of the preliminary hearing transcript fully
supports the accuracy of Brent's testimony that he was not
testifying because he had received immunity.

In response to

defendant's questions at the preliminary hearing, Brent testified
that he was not promised that the State would not press charges
against him if he testified against defendant (P.H. at 7, 25), he
did not know why charges had not been pursued against him (P.H.
at 25), and he was not told that if he testified against
defendant he would not go to detention or jail (Id..).3

This

testimony is fully consistent with the responses given by Brent

3

At one point, Brent responded "[y]esM when defense counsel
asked him, "You've had certain promises made to you to testify,
isn't that true?" (P.H. at 16). Counsel did not elaborate on the
question, and the record does not disclose any promises.
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at trial and the State's commitment given at the preliminary
hearing.

Defendant provides no evidence that Brent's assertion

at trial that he could not remember the events of the preliminary
hearing was perjured testimony requiring correction.
Brent's truthful testimony in response to defendant's
questioning at trial did not engender any .false impression which
would affect the jury's judgment.

The false impression alleged

by defendant is that Brent was testifying "in spite of the effect
it may have on his own trial" (Brief of Appellant at 12).
However, the jury knew that Brent had not been charged for his
part in the crime and therefore knew that no trial was scheduled
for him.

Upon hearing that defendant began making threats to

Brent after defendant's arrest (Tr. at 59-61, 97), the jury could
reasonably infer that the threats motivated Brent's testimony.
The challenged exchange at trial accurately indicated that Brent
had not been promised immunity from prosecution or detention in
exchange for his testimony.

In light of the remaining evidence,

the exchange is more fairly interpreted as indicating that Brent
testified in hopes of later receiving some unspecified form of
favorable treatment from the State—a point actively argued by
defendant in closing (Tr. at 208-09).

Finally, no objection or

reference to the alleged false impression was made during trial
by either counsel or by the trial court, indicating that at the
time, neither the parties nor the court had identified any false
impression from Brent's testimony.
700 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Utah 1985).
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See, e.g., State v. Smith,

Thus, it is unlikely the jury

received and was affected by the impression defendant identifies
as false and prejudicial•
Brent's testimony at trial was truthful and is
reinforced by the preliminary hearing transcript.

The exchange

gave no false impression to the jury in light of the remaining
evidence and their reasonable inferences. Accordingly, there was
no false evidence for the State to correct.
Alternatively, defendant acknowledges that his trial
counsel may have waived this issue by failing to offer at trial
either the recording or a transcript of the preliminary hearing.
He contends that his counsel's failure to preserve the issue
constitutes ineffective assistance.

To establish his claim,

defendant must show that his counsel's failure to act fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered
prejudice from counsel's deficient performance.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-66
(1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Frame,
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

Because Brent's trial testimony

was accurate, there was no error to be preserved by defendant's
counsel and his action could not be deficient.4
A

Defense counsel's failure to present the preliminary hearing
testimony at trial may also be viewed as a matter of trial strategy
where the testimony would have corroborated and reinforced Brent's
contention that he was not promised immunity in exchange for his
testimony. The fact that counsel's decision to avoid the possible
adverse consequences to the defense did not prove beneficial to
defendant does not compel a finding of ineffective assistance.
State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991); State v. Bullock,
791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,
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B,

Reversal is Not Warranted Because Any False Impression did

not Affect the Judgment of the Jury
If this Court finds that the cross-examination created
a false impression, it must then determine whether the impression
materially impacted the conviction.

A material impact occurs

when there is "a reasonable likelihood the false impression . . .
could have affected the judgment of the jury."

Walker, 624 P.2d

at 690-911; see also Shabata, 678 P.2d at 789; State v. Jarrell,
608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980).

This materiality standard is

similar to the "prejudice" prong applied to defendant's
alternative claim that his trial counsel was ineffective,
requiring that defendant demonstrate that his counsel's failure
to act was so prejudicial as "to undermine confidence in the
reliability of the verdict."

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.

Defendant

has met neither standard here.
Application of the materiality standard requires a
review of the evidence presented to the jury.
624 P.2d at 690-91.

See, e.g., Walker,

In this case, the false impression defendant

advances is not reasonably likely to have affected the jury's
judgment when weighed against: 1) the facts uncontested by
defendant at trial confirming part of Brent's testimony; 2) the
testimony of other witnesses corroborating Brent's testimony; and
3) the evidence and reasonable inferences suggesting, as
defendant argued, that Brent received some form of favorable
treatment from the State.
1023-24 (Utah 1987).
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This is not a case w? re the evidence of guilt is
sufficiently weak or the facts so controverted as to warrant a
determination that the allegedly false impression affected the
jury's judgment.

See, e.g., id., 624 P.2d at 690-91 (knowingly

false police testimony linking defendant with a controlled
substance presented in support of case based solely on
circumstantial evidence).
the offense occurred.

There is no question in this case that

Defendant confirmed numerous facts

surrounding both the offense and his involvement, including:

the

origin of the check; his call to Brent the morning of the offense
to arrange to pick Brent up at work (Tr. at 151-52, 162-63, 16667); his presence at both venues where Brent tried to cash the
check (Tr. 152-54); his active phone search for places to cash
the check without identification (Tr. at 153-54, 178); and
Brenda's presence throughout the ordeal.

The testimony of

numerous witnesses corroborated Brent's testimony, including:
the testimony of the pawn shop owner and the store manager
regarding the events inside their establishments (Tr. at 108-15,
124-29); the testimony of the arresting officer that when she
arrested Brent, he stated that defendant's car was parked across
the street (Tr. at 120-21); and Brenda's testimony verifying
defendant's active role in cashing the check, his offer of $50.00
to Brent in exchange for Brent's success (Tr. at 80), his
repeated admonitions that he not be mentioned in the pawn shop or
check cashing store (Tr. at 70-72, 80), his use of the scissors
to cut off the misspelled indorsement on the back of the check
19

(Tr. at 78), and his use of the phone to locate a place to cash
the check (Tr. at 75-76).

Both parties fully argued this

evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in their closing
remarks.
Finally, the evidence established that Brent was a
juvenile with a learning disorder caught in the commission of a
crime to which he confessed to police (Tr. at 18, 37-38, 42-43,
48-51, 54, 59), that he had to meet with officers related to the
juvenile court (Tr. at 45), and that no charges were being
pursued as of trial (.Id. ).

Not only could the jury reasonably

infer that by telling the authorities about an adult's
involvement in the crime Brent hoped to obtain some form of
leniency or favorable treatment from the State for himself, but
defense counsel expressly argued that inference in his closing
remarks (Tr. at 208-09).
Defendant further contends that the prosecutor actively
fostered the false impression in three respects.

First, the

prosecutor registered an objection to defense counsel's crossexamination of Brent, stating, "We are proceeding in bad faith.
At this point all of that has been answered" (Tr. at 44).
Defendant argues that the statement attributed improper motives
to his counsel and compounded the effect of the false testimony
(Brief of Appellant at 12-13).

However, the trial court

overruled the prosecutor's objection, allowed the questioning to
proceed, and thereafter specifically stated that it presumed that
the questioning was pursued in good faith (Tr. at 46). The court
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then directed the jury not to consider either counsel's comments
as evidence (Id.. ).

The jury is presumed to have followed the

court's instructions absent evidence to the contrary.

State v.

Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367f 370, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974).

Hence,

any adverse effect from the prosecutor's objection was mitigated.
Second, defendant contends that the State submitted an
instruction, later given to the jury as instruction number 7,
which reinforced the false impression with the authority of the
trial court (Brief of Appellant at 13). However, defendant
waived this allegation of error, first by expressly informing the
court at trial that he had no objections to any of the
instructions (Tr. at 145), State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023
(Utah 1987) (actively informing the trial court that there are no
objections to jury instructions waives appellate challenge to the
instructions); see also State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206
(Utah App. 1991) (approving application of the invited error
doctrine to jury instruction challenges), and second by making an
insufficient objection after the jury had been instructed,
claiming that instruction number 7 should be "a little more
clear" (Tr. at 201). See State v. Kotz, 758 P.2d 463, 466 (Utah
App. 1988) (objection indicating that an instruction was not
"appropriate" was insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal);
State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976) (a general
statement that an instruction does not correctly state the law is
not a sufficient objection to preserve the issue for appeal);
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (defendant must state "distinctly the
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matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection").
Consequently, this Court need not reach defendant's allegations
of error regarding instruction number 7.
However, should this Court address the merits of this
challenge, it will find that the instruction does not warrant
reversal.

Defendant challenges this instruction's adverse effect

on the jury's credibility determination.

When reviewing a

challenge to a single jury instruction, this Court considers the
instructions as a whole, and, if the instructions "fairly tender
the case to the jury, the fact that one or more of the
instructions, standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they
might have been is not reversible error."

State v. Brooks, 638

P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); see also Perdue,
813 P.2d at 1203; State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App.
1991).

Although standing alone, instruction number 7 may not be

as clear as it could be, it is not misleading in light of the
remaining instructions given the jury.

A fair reading of

instruction 7 with the court's verbal clarification accurately
establishes that the offense involved several people and that
defendant was charged as a party to the offense (for text of
instruction number 7, see R. 32 and Addendum B, attached).

The

trial court specifically admonished the jury that its credibility
determination ran to all witnesses and was to be had pursuant to
the remaining instructions relating to credibility (Tr. at 199,
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201).

Those instructions are not challenged on appeal.5

The

jury was further admonished to consider the instructions as a
whole and to avoid any emphasis on any one instruction (R. 43).
The instruction lacks any reference to the existence or lack of
immunity and neither misled nor confused the jury regarding its
credibility determination in light of the remaining instructions
given.

Consequently, instruction number 7 did not foster the

allegedly false impression.
Third, defendant contends that the prosecutor made
statements in his closing remarks to the jury which fostered the
allegedly false impression that supposedly bolstered Brent's
credibility (Brief of Appellant at 12-14; for closing arguments,
see Addendum C, attached).6

However, the statements were within

the scope of permissible closing argument and were not reasonably
likely to have affected the jury's judgment.

Throughout the

trial and during opening and closing remarks, both the court and
counsel repeatedly reminded the jury about its responsibility to
find the facts, determine the credibility of the witnesses, weigh
all the evidence, and make their ultimate decision concerning the

5

The record indicates that defendant neither submitted nor
requested an instruction providing "important and correct
information concerning the credibility of Brent Lindsey" (Brief of
Appellant at 13-14). Consequently, he may not assert error in the
court's failure to instruct on the additional information. See
State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410, 413, 490 P.2d 890, 892 (1971)
(failure to request an instruction on a certain subject bars a
later claim that the court's failure to instruct on that subject is
error).
6

Defendant alleges that these remarks
prosecutorial misconduct. See Point II, below.
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also

constitute

guilt or innocence of the defendant (R. 30, 32, 34, 36, 43-46;
Tr. 12-13, 14-16, 46, 62, 117, 132, 198-201, 203, 204, 206, 209,
213).

Because more than one individual was involved in

commission of the offense charged against defendant, the court
took great care to instruct the jury immediately prior to the
prosecution's closing statement that its verdict was to be
limited to defendant's guilt or innocence only and not that of
any other person involved in the offense (R. 32; Tr. at 198-201).
In his initial closing remarks, the prosecutor discussed the
evidence, acknowledging that the jury must decide the credibility
of the witnesses (Tr. at 203-05).

He then pointed out the

evidence corroborating Brent's testimony and the lack of evidence
supporting defendant's story (Tr. at 205-06), immediately
following which he said:
Keep in mind, I would ask you, that Brent is not
on trial. That is for another day. The defendant is
on trial. It is his credibility that I would suggest
is really in issue in this case. . . .
(Tr. at 206). Defendant contends that this improperly suggests
to the jury that Brent had not received immunity and would, in
fact, be tried at some future date.

However, the distinction

made between the ultimate determination of defendant's guilt or
innocence and that of Brent is proper in the context of this case
and is an appropriate matter to be considered by the jury.

Both

the parties and the court exhibited genuine concern that the jury
recognize the boundaries of its responsibilities.

The

prosecutor's comments, a small part of his closing remarks, were
at the end of his initial closing argument, indicating a desire
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to refocus the jury's attention from the evidence previously
discussed to their ultimate decision of the guilt or innocence of
defendant.

Although not artful, they are not improper as they

constitute an accurate admonition to the jury that the ultimate
decision should not encompass Brent's guilt, thereby reinforcing
the court's similar admonition to the jury.

Even assuming the

statements were improper, their effect likely was negligible in
view of the remaining evidence and defendant's subsequent
argument which not only emphasized the likelihood of favorable
treatment for Brent due to his testimony against defendant (Tr.
at 208-09), but also echoed the prosecutor's remarks:

"[Brent

and Brenda] are not on trial in this case; [defendant] is" (Tr.
at 209).
Defendant also challenges statements made by the
prosecutor in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument as
fostering the allegedly false impression to the jury.
Defendant's closing argument focused on the credibility and bias
of Brent and Brenda, emphasizing that Brent was lying in an
attempt to escape "the penalties that he may face" and that
Brenda lied for her brother because he faced "a possible long
term detention" (Tr. at 208-10).

In his rebuttal statements, the

prosecutor refuted defense counsel's bias arguments, at one point
saying, "[Brent] incriminates himself all the away [sic] through
the case" (Tr. at 215). Defendant contends that this statement
fosters the allegedly false impression that Brent testified
without regard for its effect on his own trial.
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However, that

simple statement is one of fact based on Brent's admission of
guilt, which was part of the evidence to be considered by the
jury.
Given the evidence before the jury discussed above,
together with defense counsel's express argument that the
evidence supported a determination directly opposite the
impression he alleges on appeal, it is unlikely that the
prosecutor's statements sufficiently emphasized the challenged
impression, assuming it ever existed, to render the impression
reasonably likely to have affected the jury's judgment.
otherwise would be to sanction invited error.

To hold

The record is

clear that defendant initiated and prolonged the immunity
discourse at trial, mischaracterized the State's commitment as an
exchange of immunity for Brent's testimony despite full knowledge
to the contrary, and failed to correct the false impression he
now claims the exchange created, despite ample opportunity to do
so.

He cannot now successfully assert error from a situation he

created, then ignored.

See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 573

(Utah App. 1991) (defendant's failure to seek court's assistance
in masking parts of transcript at trial prevented assertion of
error on appeal; defendant cannot "ignore a potentially improper
situation at trial, thus inviting or compounding error, and opt
to raise it on appeal after the outcome of the action is adverse
to him"); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349-50 (Utah App. 1991)
(it is not appropriate for the defense to invite error and rely
on it for appeal); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah
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1989), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990) ("[I]f a

party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain
from objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will
then decline to save that party from the error.").
Because the allegedly false impression, assuming that
it actually arose, was not reasonably likely to have affected the
jury's judgment under the circumstances of the case, it follows
that defense counsel's alleged failure to correct the false
impression was not so prejudicial as to "undermine confidence in
the reliability of the verdict", Frame, 723 P.2d at 405, and
defendant's alternative claim of ineffective assistance must also
fail.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAIVED REVIEW OF THE PROSECUTOR'S
CLOSING REMARKS; ALTERNATIVELY, THE REMARKS
WERE NEITHER IMPROPER NOR PREJUDICIAL AND
WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PROPER CLOSING
ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that in closing argument the
prosecutor made several statements which amount to prosecutorial
misconduct.

First, he contends that the prosecutor's closing

remarks improperly emphasized Brent Lindsey's alleged "lack of
immunity" (Brief of Appellant at 20). Second, he argues that
several statements made in the prosecutor's initial closing
remarks as well as an assertion of defendant's guilt made at the
end of the prosecution's closing argument improperly urged the
jury to base its decision on societal concerns extraneous to the
evidence at trial, and erroneously injected the prosecutor's
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personal opinions which inflamed the jury to "act out of improper
motive" (Brief of Appellant at 20-24).

However, defendant failed

to preserve these objections for appellate review.

In the

alternative, if defendant's challenges are deemed preserved for
appeal, the conviction should be affirmed because, under the
totality of the circumstances of the case, the statements neither
suggest to the jury matters it may not consider in deliberations
nor exceed the scope of permissible closing argument.

See State

v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 786 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah
App. 1990).
Defendant failed to object to all but one of the
prosecutor's closing statements to which he assigns error on
appeal.7

Although a trial court may have an obligation to

correct, sua sponte, improper remarks made to the jury, this
Court has held that a party's failure to make a contemporaneous
and specific objection at trial will preclude appellate review of
an alleged improper prosecutorial argument.

Compare State v.

Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1985), with Humphrey, 793 P.2d
at 925, and State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1226-27 (Utah 1989),
and State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982).

Even where

appellate review is had, the absence of an objection is a factor
in determining the prejudicial impact of the challenged argument.

7

The sole objection to the prosecutor's remarks which was
registered by defendant at trial relates to the prosecutor's
characterization of the importance of this case and is addressed at
the end of Point II.
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See Smith, 700 P.2d at 1113 (finding a failure to object as
indicative that "defendant's concerns about improper influence
have arisen in the course of the preparation of this appeal,
rather than from perceptions at the time of trial.").

If

appellate review is granted to defendant's challenges, those
allegations will be found meritless.
"Counsel for both sides have considerable latitude in
their arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss fully
from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and
deductions arising therefrom."

State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54,

60, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973); see also State v. Seel, 827 P.2d
954, 959 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255
(Utah 1988), rev'd on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied,
1942 (1992).

U.S.

, 112 S. Ct.

A prosecutor's remarks will not warrant reversal

unless they meet the two-part test established by the Utah
Supreme Court:

M

(1) did the remarks call to the attention of the

jurors matters which they could not properly consider in
determining their verdict, and (2) was the error substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that
without the error the result would have been more favorable for
the defendant."

Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 925; see also Harrison,

805 P.2d at 786; state v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah App.
1990); Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at 426. Application of
part two of the test involves consideration of the entire record
and the circumstances involved in each case, including an
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evaluation of the evidence of guilt.

State v. Andreason, 718

P.2d 400, 402-03 (Utah 1986); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486
(Utah 1984).

The more compelling the proof of guilt, the less

closely this Court will scrutinize the conduct.

Troy, 688 P.2d

at 846.
Defendant's first challenge regarding the prosecutor's
allegedly improper emphasis on Brent's "lack of immunity" is
discussed fully in Point 1(B) above, regarding the State's
alleged use of false testimony.

That discussion also illustrates

that the challenged comments do not meet either prong of the test
for prosecutorial misconduct.

The remarks reflect facts already

in evidence and do not present the jury with matters not properly
considered by them.

Similarly, the absence of the challenged

remarks would not likely have resulted in a more favorable result
for defendant in light of the remaining evidence discussed in
Point 1(B), including defendant's express assertion that the
evidence implies some grant or hope of favorable treatment for
Brent due to his testimony, and the fact that defendant's own
testimony reinforced Brent's admission of guilt.
Defendant also challenges several additional excerpts
from the prosecutor's closing remarks which may be divided into
two groups.

The first group follows the prosecutor's discussion

of the evidence relating to the elements of the crime and
defendant's intent and knowledge of numerous facts presented at
the trial.

He then summarizes the State's deduction from its

view of the evidence, saying:
30

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that defendant
is guilty. He's the guiltiest defendant that has ever
engaged in this business. That is a despicable crime,
to use someone else to commit the crime that you, if
you had the guts to, would at least commit yourself.
(Tr. at 204-05; see Addendum C, attached).

Defendant contends

that these statements represent the prosecutor's personal opinion
regarding the defendant's guilt and improperly asks the jury to
punish defendant out of a "policy to punish 'despicable' people"
(Brief of Appellant at 24). However, the prosecutor has a right
to discuss fully from the State's viewpoint the evidence,
inferences and deductions which establish defendant's guilt.

See

Seel, 827 P.2d at 959; Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at 426.
Consequently, the remarks are within the range of permissible
arguments available to both sides.

See Day, 815 P.2d at 1350;

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 (Utah 1987) (citations
omitted).

Although his characterization of the crime as

despicable is more spirited than may be desirable, it is not
improper.

He ties his conclusion of guilt directly to the

evidence presented at trial, and does not inject a plea regarding
societal concerns or the jury's duty to address those concerns.
See, e.g., Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402 (finding improper an
argument that defendant's "conduct was pervasive, that others
were involved in similar conduct, and that the jury needed to be
concerned about those 'who aren't innocent but are turned
loose.'"); Smith, 700 P.2d at 1112 (finding improper an argument
asking, "[d]o we go so far in determining that we don't punish an
innocent man that we let too many guilty ones go . • . " ) .
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In

the context of the totality of the case, including repeated
instructions to the jury that statements by counsel were not to
be considered as evidence, the comments would have little impact,
The lack of objections by defense counsel to the comments
supports their minimal prejudicial impact.

See Smith, 700 P.2d

at 1113.
The second group of comments challenged by defendant
occurred as the prosecutor began his initial closing remarks:
[PROSECUTOR]: . . . I think that in this case,
more than any other, I think we have to consider that
everyone in this country has a right to be protected
under the law. I think Mr. Schoor [sic] deserves that
protection.
I think the witnesses who have testified in this
case deserve that protection. Brent Lindsev, as well
as the defendant, has put his faith in that system.
Brent Lindsev, as you heard him testify at the
conclusion of this case, said, "No, I'm not afraid of
the defendant," even though he testified he was
threatened by him.
He says that because he has people around him that
will protect him.
I'd like to think the State of Utah
did its job in protecting Brent Lindsey and allowing
him to get up on that stand and give his story.
Now this is as far as I can go. From here on it's
up to you. You can either look at the evidence, come
to a just conclusion and render a verdict that protects
Mr. Lindsev, or vou can not come to a conclusion, you
can get upset, vou can get angry about things that
really have nothing to do with this case, and vou can
walk away from this.
I'm going to be back here tomorrow. So is Mr.
Grindstaff, so is the Judge. We've lots of other
cases. You may have noticed during that trial that I
got pretty angry at times. This isn't a murder trial.
I've done murder trials before, but I don't think I
have seen such an important case as this for a long,
long time.
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object to him discussing his
personal opinions. And his personal views.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

[PROSECUTOR]: It's important for that very
reason, that in this case we have to discuss something
that only jurors can decide.
(Tr. at 202-03; see Addendum C, attached) .(emphasis added).
Defendant challenges each of the three highlighted segments as
advancing the prosecutor's personal opinions and improperly
urging the jury to decide the case based on extraneous societal
concerns.
The prosecutor's reference to the basic premise of
protection under the law is no more than a broadly accurate
prefatory statement, and any prejudice flowing therefrom would be
abated by counsel's blanket application of the protection to the
country's entire populace, all the witnesses in this case, andf
more specifically, to Brent as well as to defendant (Tr. at 202).
His example of Brent's "faith" in the judicial system is simply a
restatement of evidence received at trial and already properly
before the jury (Tr. at 59-62).
Defendant compares these statements with those
condemned in West Valley City v. Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah App.
1987).

However, the prosecutor in this case, unlike the one in

Rislow, did not urge that defendant's guilt or innocence hinged
on whether the jurors wanted to encourage or stop other people in
society from committing the same crime in areas frequented by the
jurors.

Although in verbally shifting the burden of a final

decision to the jury the prosecutor urges a verdict "that
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protects Mr. Lindsey", he mitigates any potential prejudice by
expressly and accurately tying the jury's verdict to the evidence
in this case and does not urge improper consideration of matters
extraneous to the case.

See Troy, 718 P.2d at 486 (reiterating

the jury's duty to convict solely on the evidence and condemning
statements suggesting a different basis for the decision).
Defendant's failure to object to the statements below indicates
their minimal prejudicial potential.

Smith, 700 P.2d at 1113.

In accordance with his objection below, defendant
challenges the prosecutor's characterization of the importance of
this case as an improper personal opinion "calculated to inflame
the jury to act out of improper motive" (Brief of Appellant at
23-24).

The State does not condone the prosecutor's comparison,

but contends that the prosecutor's immediate explanation of his
remark adequately mitigated any prejudice which may otherwise
have resulted.

After advancing the statement, the prosecutor

specifically interpreted it for the jury, indicating, as does
defendant on appeal, that the importance stems from the fact that
jurors alone can decide the extent of knowledge to be imputed to
the parties, the credibility of the witnesses heard at trial, and
the ultimate guilt or innocence of this defendant (Tr. at 203-04;
Brief of Appellant at 23). The statement neither urges the
jury's use of extraneous information nor advocates that the
jurors ignore either the court's instructions or the evidence
before them.

The jury reasonably could differentiate between a

murder trial and the forgery case before it, and defendant has
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failed to establish any reasonable likelihood that absent the
comparison the verdict would have been more favorable.

Without

prejudice, the remark could be no more than harmless error.
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 555; Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at
426; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 30 ("[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded").
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case,
the prosecutor's comments are within the scope of permissible
argument as they concern the State's perspective of the evidence
before the jury and the reasonable inferences and deductions
arising therefrom.

The comments do not urge a decision based on

extraneous matters, and did not prejudice defendant.
POINT III
ANY ERROR IN THE STATE'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
DEFENDANT CONCERNING ANOTHER WITNESS'
VERACITY WAS HARMLESS WHERE DEFENDANT
SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE AND THE COURT SUSTAINED
DEFENDANT'S TIMELY OBJECTIONS
Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly
cross-examined defendant concerning Mr. Lords' veracity, thereby
unfairly commenting on defendant's credibility and urging the
jury to deal improperly with the credibility issue (Brief of
Appellant at 25). Regardless of the propriety of the
prosecutor's inquiries, any error in the questioning was harmless
where the court sustained defendant's timely objections and
thereby mitigated any potential prejudice.
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During the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant,
he asked three questions (highlighted below) which defendant
challenges on appeal as being unfairly prejudicial:
[PROSECUTOR:] You heard Mr. Lords testimony that
he served Brent and that he recalls very distinctly
that he is the one that took the check from Brent on
that occasion and it was misspelled on the back?
[DEFENDANT:]

Yes, I did hear Mr- Lords say that.

Q. Is that different what [sic] than what you're
telling the jury now? It is, isn't it?
A. Yes. But — what I do remember is Mr. Lords
helping me, and Danny helping Brent.
Q.

So Jack is not telling the truth?

A. I am sure Jack is telling what he can
remember.
Q. Well, a misspelled check, that was an unusual
occurrence, isn't it?
A.

Awe, I —

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
don't think it's relevant.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

Your Honor, I

It's cross-examination.

[PROSECUTOR:] Wouldn't you agree that a person
who endorses a check made out to him and misspells
their own name is an unusual occurrence?
A.

Yes.

Q. And wouldn't you remember the person who
presented you a check and misspelled his own name?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
conjecture.
THE COURT:
A.

Objection, asking for

Overruled.

Yes.

[PROSECUTOR:]
confused?

So why do you think Jack Lords is
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A.

I don't think it's —

[DEFENSE COUNSEL];
has the —
THE COURT:

Objection, I don't think he

Sustained.

[PROSECUTOR:] Why, under these ciscumstances
rsicl, do vou believe that Jack Lords is mistaken?
A.

I believe —

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't think it's relevant,
what his opinion is as to Jack Lords —
THE COURT:
objection.

I'm going the [sic] sustain the

(Tr. at 174-76) (emphasis added).
The courts in this jurisdiction have not directly ruled
on the propriety of asking a witness or a defendant at trial
questions regarding the veracity of another witness.

But see

State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah April 7, 1992)
(indicating in dicta that such questions would be improper).

Of

the other jurisdictions addressing the issue, a clear majority
have found such questioning to be improper to varying degrees.
See, e.g., People v. Best, 424 N.E.2d 29, 32 (111. App. 1981)
(although improper, "veracity opinion questions alone do not
constitute reversible error"); State v. Flanagan, 801 P.2d 675,
679 (N.M. App.), cert, denied, 801 P.2d 659 (N.M. 1990) (imposing
strict prohibition on asking a defendant on cross-examination if
another witness is "mistaken" or "lying", but providing that
admission of all other forms of such questions lies within the
trial court's discretion; finding the trial court's failure to
sustain defendant's objection to prohibited questions was
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harmless error); Pankratz v. State, 663 P.2d 26, 28 (Okl. Cr.
1983) (such questioning is an effort to impeach which, although
not desirable, is not necessarily error); State v. CastenedaPerez, 810 P.2d 74, 79 (Wash. App. 1991) (condemning practice as
improper).

Regardless of the degree of disapproval accorded such

questioning, courts have not held that the practice requires
reversal per se.

Instead, they universally turn to a harmless

error analysis to determine whether the evidentiary impropriety
resulted in sufficient prejudice to defendant to warrant
reversal.

Best, 424 N.E.2d at 32; Flanagan, 801 P.2d at 679-80;

Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d at 79,
Even if the contested questions before this Court are
found to be improper, reversal would not be warranted because
defendant suffered only minimal, if any, prejudice.

Defendant

has the burden of establishing the existence of reversible error.
State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989).

An error

requires reversal only if there is "a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result" absent the error.

State v. Tuttle, 780

P.2d 1203, 1213 n.12 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Evid. 103; Utah R.
Crim. P. 30.
The only objections made by defendant to the three
veracity inquiries occurred following the second and third
questions and were sustained by the trial court (Tr. at 175-76).
Because defendant failed to object to counsel's first question
concerning Lords' truthfulness, he waived appellate review of the
question.

Day, 815 P.2d at 1349-50 (failure to raise an
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objection constitutes waiver of the alleged error); Humphrey, 793
P.2d at 925 (failure to object to cross-examination constitutes
waiver of appellate review of the alleged errors); Hales, 652
P.2d at 1292; see also Casteneda-Perez, 810 P.2d at 79 (defendant
waived review of the initial stage of the improper crossexamination due to his failure to make a definite objection until
after the questioning was well underway).
Even on the merits, defendant's appellate challenge to
the prosecutor's initial question must fail because the
prejudicial dangers feared in such a situation did not
materialize.

Defendant's response to this question offered a

plausible explanation for the suggested discrepancy, thereby
sidestepping the predicted response of labeling either Lords or
himself as a liar and suggesting instead that neither was
deliberately lying.

See Flanagan, 801 P.2d at 679-80 (questions

intended to clarify discrepancies are acceptable; holding that
improper questions are harmless where defendant's responses
avoided the dangers feared by the court).

It was well within

defendant's knowledge to provide an opinion as to the reason for
the differences in the testimony, Id.., 801 P.2d at 679-80, and
his response diffused the possibility that the jury would feel
bound to label one or the other a liar.

See Casteneda-Perez, 810

P.2d at 79-80 (witnesses' responses alerted the jury that any
discrepancies may not be due to false testimony).
The prosecutor's subsequent questions do not warrant
reversal because any prejudice resulting from the questions was
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avoided by timely, successful objections forestalling any
response by defendant.

Additionally, there was minimal, if any,

impact on the proceedings where the questioning was neither
prolonged nor argumentative, the issue was not argued in closing
argument, and the questions were restricted to a single
discrepancy in the testimony of one witness who did not testify
regarding any criminal behavior by defendant (see Brief of
Appellant at 25). Any potential prejudice from the single
discrepancy was minimized where both sides vigorously argued the
credibility of numerous witnesses in their closing arguments, the
differences between the parties' versions of the evidence was
abundantly clear to the jury, and the jury was adequately
admonished throughout the proceedings that the questions by
counsel did not constitute evidence (Tr. at 5-6, 46). Absent
evidence to the contrary, the jurors are presumed to have
followed the instructions.

State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 370,

517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974); see also State v. White, 577 P.2d
552, 555 (Utah 1978).

Given such brief, isolated questioning and

the adequate mitigation provided by the prompt action of both
defendant and the court, there could be no reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome absent the questioning.

Accordingly,

any error in the cross-examination was harmless, and reversal is
not warranted.
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POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE BECAUSE NO
MULTIPLE, SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS WERE COMMITTED
BELOW
Defendant finally contends that even if the individual
errors he asserts do not warrant reversal .of his conviction, the
aggregate of the errors constitutes "fundamental and reversible
error" (Brief of Appellant at 25-26).

However, the cumulative

error doctrine does not apply where no multiple, substantial
errors were committed.

State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah

1987); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986).
Defendant claims error relating to production of false
testimony, prosecutorial misconduct, improper cross-examination,
and, alternatively, ineffective assistance of counsel.

As the

preceding arguments demonstrate, defendant has waived most of the
alleged errors, and the remaining errors are at most harmless.
Accordingly, the cumulative error doctrine should not apply, and
defendant's conviction should be affirmed.

See State v. Johnson,

784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989); State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29,
38 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989);
Rammel, 721 P.2d at 501-02; but see State v. Emmett, 184 Utah
Adv. Rep. 34, 36 (Utah April 7, 1992) (several potentially
harmless errors combined with an egregious instance of
prosecutorial misconduct warrant a new trial).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

//^ciay of August, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Joan
C. Watt and Robert L. Steele, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,
attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111, this / fir day of Augustr 1992.
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ADDENDUM A

I N THE THIRD D I S T R I C T

COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4

THE STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

5
6

VS.

7

N0.900330-CA

8

CR90-574

9
10

THOMAS W.

SCHNOOR,

DEFENDANT.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

REPORTER'S

TRANSCRIPT

HEARING OF MAY 1 ,

1990

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R.

MURPHY

18
19
"c'c--"OwtrJct

20

FEB 0 8

21
22

^/£ 4 & I
DtfpUiy CrfSfK

23
24
25

REPORTED BY GAYLE B.

CAMPBELL,

CSR,RPR.

1

THAT THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE READ IN SUBSTANTIALLY THE

2

FORM THAT THEY ARE TYPED, AND THAT ANY DEVIATION

3

THEREFROM IS OF NO PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE?

4

MR. MORGAN:

FROM THE STATE, YES, YOUR HONOR.

5

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

6

THE COURT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

COUPLE OF ITEMS, MEMBERS OF THE

7

JURY, BEFORE WE BEGIN CLOSING ARGUMENT. I WANT YOU TO

8

REFER TO INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN.

9

SUGGESTION TO YOU IN THERE THAT MORE THAN ONE PERSON HAS

10

BEEN NAMED IN THIS INFORMATION.

11

THAT IS NOT THE CASE.

THERE MAY BE A

I BELIEVE WHAT THE INTENT OF

12

THIS INSTRUCTIONS IS, IS TO POINT OUT TO YOU THAT MORE

13

THAN ONE PERSON —

14

ONE PERSON WAS INVOLVED IN THE CHARGE IN THIS CASE.

15

POINT OF THIS IS TO INDICATE THAT MR. SCHNOOR IS BEING

16

CHARGED AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE.

THAT IT CAN BE ALLEGED THAT MORE THAN

17

AM I CORRECT IN THAT?

18

MR. MORGAN:

19

THE COURT:

THE

YES.
IS THERE ANY FURTHER ELABORATION

20

NECESSARY, OR RETRACTION OF ANYTHING THAT I'VE JUST SAID

21

THERE, MR. MORGAN?

22
23

MR. MORGAN:
BENCH, YOUR HONOR.

24
25

PERHAPS WE OUGHT TO APPROACH THE

(BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE RECORD.)
THE COURT:

ONE THING FURTHER ON INSTRUCTION
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1

NUMBER SEVEN, MEMBERS OF THE JURY.

2

OBVIOUSLY REFERRING, ALBEIT OBLIOELY, TO THE TWO LINDSEYS

3

WHO TESTIFIED, BRENT AND BRENDA.

4

THAT INSTRUCTION IS

IN THAT CONNECTION, YOU'RE TO ADHERE TO THIS

5

INSTRUCTION, THE LAST SENTENCE, WHICH INDICATES THAT YOU

6

ARE NOT TO CONCERN YOURSELF WITH THEIR STATUS.

7

CONSIDER THEIR TESTIMONY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OTHER

8

INSTRUCTIONS OF THIS COURT WHICH ARE IN THIS PACKAGE

9

WHICH WILL ASSIST YOU IN MAKING YOUR DETERMINATION AS TO

10
11

YOU'RE TO

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES.
ONE OTHER THING I THINK I NEED TO TELL YOU IS THAT I

12

RAPIDLY PUT THIS SET OF INSTRUCTIONS TOGETHER OF ONES

13

THAT ARE ON THE WORD PROCESSER IN THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD

14

BE ABLE TO INSTRUCT YOU YESTERDAY AND GET THIS COMPLETED.

15

IN MY HASTE TO DO SO, YOU WILL SEE THAT THERE WERE

16

TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS, BUT MORE PARTICULARLY, THAT THERE

17

WERE SOME ERRORS IN GENDER REFERENCE.

18

INSTRUCTIONS THAT I NORMALLY USE, THAT I LIKE TO KEEP,

19

ARE GENDER-BLIND, AND IF ANYONE IS OFFENDED BY THAT, I

20

APOLOGIZE.

THE SET OF

21

IT'S JUST AN OLD SET, AND I WON'T USE THEM AGAIN.

22

ALSO, I WANT TO INDICATE TO YOU THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO

23

WORRY ABOUT DRAFTING A VERDICT OF YOUR OWN.

24

VERDICT FORMS THAT WILL GO WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM

25

THAT PRESENT EACH OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES THAT YOU WILL

WE HAVE
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1
2

THAN PRESENTED WITH.
AFTER YOUR DELIBERATIONS, YOU SELECT THE APPROPRIATE

3

ONE AND HAVE THE FOREPERSON DATE AND EXECUTE THE

4

APPROPRIATE ONE, AND SEND BACK TO ME BOTH THE ONE SIGNED

5

THE ONE NOT SIGNED, THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE

6

EXHIBITS WHICH WILL BE IN THERE WITH YOU.

7

DO COUNSEL HAVE ANY OBJECTION AS TO ANY OF THE

8

THINGS THAT I HAVE INDICATED TO THE JURY SINCE READING

9

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS?

MR. MORGAN?

10

MR. MORGAN:

11

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

12

RATHER DO IT AFTER—

13

THE COURT:

NOTHING FROM THE STATE.
ONE OBJECTION.

WELL, I NEED TO BE ALERTED

14

THERE IS SOMETHING I CAN CORRECT.

15

CORRECT IT IF IT'S APPROPRIATE.

16

THE SIDEBAR.

17
16

BUT I WOULD

IF

I'M CERTAINLY GOING TO
SO WHY DON'T YOU COME TO

(BENCH CONFERENCE, OFF THE RECORD.)
THE COURT:

ONE FINAL THING, AND I SAY THIS IN AN

19

ABUNDANCE OF CAUTION, THAT I MAKE CERTAIN THAT I HAVE NOT

20

MISSTATED ANYTHING AND I DON'T STATE IT FOR ANY PURPOSE

21

OF REPETITION OR ANY UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THIS POINT.

22

STATED IT BEFORE AND YOU UNDERSTOOD IT AS I STATED IT

23

BEFORE, DON'T THINK I AM TRYING TO EMPHASIZE IT, BECAUSE

24

I MAY STATE IT AGAIN.

25

IF I

THE LAST SENTENCE IN INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN, IS
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1

NOT IN ANY WAY TO SUGGEST THAT YOU ARE NOT TO CONSIDER

2

THE BELIEVABILITY OR THE CREDIBILITY OF BRENT AND BRENDA

3

LINDSEY IN THE SAME MANNER THAT YOU CONSIDER THE

4

CREDIBILITY OF ANY OTHER WITNESS.

5

YOU HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT ISSUE.

YOU WILL CONSIDER

6

THAT IN THE SAME WAY AND UNDER THE;SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS

7

YOU WOULD CONSIDER THE CREDIBILITY OF MR. SCHNOOR OR ANY

8

OTHER WITNESS WHO TESTIFIED HERE.

9

DOES THAT TAKE CARE OF YOUR PROBLEM?

10

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

13

DOES IT OR DOES IT NOT?
I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE A

LITTLE MORE CLEAR.

14
15

MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH?

THE COURT:
OVERRULED.

ALL RIGHT.

FURTHER OBJECTIONS

ARE YOU READY FOR CLOSING?

16

MR. MORGAN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. MORGAN:

STATE IS, YOUR HONOR.
GO AHEAD, MR. MORGAN.
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, MR.

19

GRINDSTAFF, MR. SCHNOOR, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

20

CLOSING ARGUMENT.

THIS IS

21

AS MR. GRINDSTAFF STAFF INDICATED EARLIER, I WILL BE

22

GIVING A STATEMENT OF THE STATE'S CASE, HE WILL BE GIVING

23

HIS ARGUMENTS THE CASE, AND THEN I WILL BE BACK FOR

24

REBUTTAL ONE LAST TIME.

25

I WILL TRY AND BE BRIEF IN REBUTTAL.

I WOULD ASK
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ADDENDUM B

CERTIFIED COPY
1

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

3
4

-oOoSTATE OF UTAH,

5
6
7

Case No. 901002110FS

Plaintiff,

PRELIMINARY HEARING

vs,
THOMAS W. SCHNOOR,

6

Defendant.

9

-oOo-

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 29th day of March, 1990,

12

the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the

13

Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, sitting as Judge in the above-

14

named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following

15

proceedings were had.

16

-oOo-

17

APPEARANCES:

18

For the State:

MR. MARTIN VERHOEF
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

MR. DAVID L. GRINDSTAFF
Attorney at Law
395 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

1
2
3

4

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. VERHOEF:
Q

Would you please state your full name and spell your

last name, sir?

5

A

Brent Lindsey, L-i-n-d-s-e-y.

6

Q

And how old are you, Brent?

7

A

I'm 16.

8

Q

Okay.

9

Lindsey,

And are you aware of the meaning of the oath to

tell the truth that you just took?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

12

w. Schnoor?

13

A

14

Yes.

I am.
Are you acquainted with the defendant, Thomas

I am.

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

Your Honor, there—there's one matter

15

I might address the Court on.

16

report, it appears that Mr. Lindsey is identified as a suspect

17

and there's been a juvenile referral on this particular case.

18

And I don't think that it's appropriate that—that w e — I give

19

him legal advice, or even the Court; but if he testifies, what

20

he says may incriminate himself.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. VERHOEF:

23

Is he charged?
Let me ask the question to the witness,

your Honor.

24
25

It's my—looking at the police

THE COURT:
Q

All right.

(By Mr. Verhoef)

Go ahead.

Mr. Lindsey, are you—were you

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
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1

referred to Juvenile Court as a result of this offense?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And is there a matter pending in Juvenile Court

4

currently?

5

A

What do you mean?

6

Q

Well, maybe that's a bad question.

7
8

I don't—

Why don't you tell the Judge what the status of that is
over in Juvenile Court?

9

A

Well, t h e — I don't—I don't get what you're saying.

10

Q

What happened—did you go to Court on that?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Do you have anything left to do with the Court on that

13

I did go to Court.

deal?

14

THE COURT:

15

THE WITNESS:

16

THE COURT:

18

THE WITNESS:
this

W e l l , t h e y j u s t t o l d me t o w a i t — w a i t

When's t h a t ?
T h i s d a y , t o l d me t o w a i t and come back

day.

20
21

i n Court?

f o r t h e main—main c o u r t d a y .

17

19

What happened

THE COURT:

Are you charged out there in Juvenile

Court?

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

Oh.

No, I'm not charged out there.

Were you fined, out there?
No.

Ordered to commu—any community service?

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
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5

1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

Huh uh, no, I wasn't, sir.

Okay.

Why did you go out there then?

They—I had to talk to some—some guy,

*

I don't know his name and stuff, but he gave me a card of his—^

5

what—his name and stuff.

6

THE COURT:

Do you ever have to appear out there again?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE COURT:

9

THE WITNESS:

No.

Do you have a probation officer—
No.

10

THE COURT:

11

Is there anybody out there that you have to talk to?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

14

— o u t at Juvenile Court?

No.

your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

You may.

16
17
IB
19

If I could voir dire the witness,

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRINDSTAFF:
Q

As a result of an alleged crime of passing some sort of

forged instrument, did you have to go to Juvenile Court?

20

A

Did I have to?

21

Q

Right.

22

A

Yes.

23 I

Q

You went there?

24

A

No.

25

Q

What happened when you went there?

The place out o n — i n South Salt Lake City?
I went there.
And are you return there?

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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1

A

They just talked to me and told me that I was going to

2

come up to the real—real judge and stuff like that/ and said I

3

was probably going to get a fine—fine or nothing like that,

4

just be like a witness and stuff.

5

Q

Have you been granted immunity—

6

A

No.

7

Q

— f r o m charges?

you have no written—nothing in

8

writing or no promises made that you wouldn't be charged in the

9

future?

10
11
12
13

A

No.
THE COURT:

I don't see any problem in going ahead with

this witness at this point.
MR. GRINDSTAFF:

T W O problems/ one is—obviously, we

14

can't give him advice but—we're not his attorney/ but

15

potentially, looking at the

16
17
18

THE COURT:

—

Well, let me ask, is it the intention of

the State to charge this defendant in Juvenile Court?
MR. VERHOEF:

It's my understanding. Detective Mossier

19

has just informed me that the charges were once filed in

20

juvenile Court but have been dismissed; isn't that right?

21

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's correct.

And are you making a commitment now

23

on behalf of the State that you're not going to file charges

24

against the defendant in Juvenile Court based on this incident?

25

MR. VERHOEF:

Yes # I will/ your Honor. For the record,

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
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1

the State will not charge this young man with the crime.

2

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

Even if the State makes a statement

3

on the record, the—the only grant of immunity that's valid

4

under the statute's a written grant signed by the County

5

Attorney himself, and again, I think that before—

6

7

THE COURT:
that?

8
9

10

Do you have any other problem, other than

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

— w e go forward, I think that he

should probably has someone—if he has an attorney, I think
if he doesn't/ I think one should be appointed.

11

THE COURT:

I don't see a problem at this point.

I'm

12

certainly going to hold the County Attorney to it, to the

13

comment and commitment that's been made.

14

said, under the statute, is correct, it's legally correct; but!

15

obviously, the County Attorney's Office is going to be hard-

16

pressed to bring any action out at the Juvenile Court based

17

on the statements that's been made by the Deputy County Attorney,

18

So at this point, I'll allow him to go forward with

19

the examination of the witness.

20

MR. VERHOEF:

21
22
23
24
25

I realize what you've

You've made your record•

Thank you, your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continuing)

BY MR. VERHOEF:
Q

Brent, I think my question was, are you acquainted

with the defendant, Thomas «• Schnoor?
A

Yes. I am.
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

8

INSTRUCTION NO, *"]
Although
action,

the

independant

case
of

there

is more than one person named

against

that

of

each

the

person

other.

In

defendant on trial is Thomas W. Schnoor.

is

separate

this

action

in this
from

and

the

only

You are not to concern

yourselves with the status of any other person or defendant named
in this case.
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ADDENDUM C

1

0-

ROBERT WHAT?

2

A.

SFADE.

2

Q.

ROBERT WHAT?

4

A.

SPAN.

5

Q.

SPAN?

6

A.

I CAN'T SPELL THE LAST NAME.

7
8
9
10

I TON'T KNOW.

I HAVE TROUBLE -- KIND OF.
Q.

WHY DON'T YOU LOOK AT THAT EXHIBIT IN FRONT

OF YOU, EXHIBIT ONE.

OKAY.

NOW, LOOKING AT THAT

EXHIBIT?

11

A.

SPUD.

12

Q.

WHAT?

13

A.

SPUD.

14

Q.

AND YOU HAVE LOOKED AT IT NOW, AND COULD YCV

15

SPELL THAT NAME WITHOUT LOOKING AT IT AGAIN?

16

A.

I CAN'T SPELL IT.

17

Q.

WHAT'S DOES IT START WITH?

18

A.

S.

IS

Q.

WHAT DOES IT END WITH?

20

A.

E.

21

Q.

WHAT'S THE LETTERS IN BETWEEN?

22

A.

S. ~

23

Q.

NOW, YOU ADMIT YOU TRIED TO FORGE A CHECK;

24
25

S. E. —

S. R. O U P. T.

RIGHT?
A.

YES.

43

Q.

AND YOU WERE PROMISED YOU WOULDN'T GO TO

JAIL, RIGHT, IF YOU CAME AND TESTIFIED AGAINST TO!:?
3

A.

IF I WHAT? -- I DON'T GET IT.

4

Q.

WEREN'T THERE PROMISES MADE TO YOU?

A.

NO.

Q.

NO?

7

HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH THE CRIME?

HAVE YOU HAD TO GO TO THE DETENTION CENTER?

S

A.

NO.

c

Q-

THAT WAS RIGHT AFTER YOU WERE ARRESTED;

II

A.

A FEW WEEKS -- ABOUT A WEEK LATER.

12

Q.

ABOUT A WEEK LATER YOU WENT TO COURT; RIGHT?

13

A.

YES.

14

A.

WELL, IT'S NOT REALLY COURT.

15

Q.

YOU WENT AND MET WITH POLICE OFFICERS?

16

A.

I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS A POLICE OFFICER.

17

Q.

PROBATION OFFICER?

18

A.

I THINK THAT'S WHAT IT WAS.

19

Q.

DID THEY PROMISE YOU THAT IF YOU TESTIFIED

OH, YES, ONCE.

10

20

IT WAS --

FROM THE JUVENILE SYSTEM?

AGAINST TOM, THEY WOULDN'T PRESS ANY CHARGES AGAINST YOU?

21

A.

NO. NO, THEY DIDN'T.

22

Q.

HAVE THEY PRESSED CHARGES AGAINST YOU?

23
24
25

MR. MORGAN:

WE ARE PROCEEDING IN BAD FAITH.

AT THIS POINT ALL OF THAT HAS BEEN ANSWERED ..
MR. GRINDSTAFF:

I DON'T BELIEVE HE'S ANSWERED

44

1

THAT QUESTION.

2

THE COURT:

HE CAN ANSWER THAT QUESTIOI\.

2

THE WITNESS:

WILL YOU REPEAT IT?.

4

Q.

HAVE THERE BEEN CHARGES FRESSED AGAINST YOU'

5

A.

UM, NO.

6

Q.

NO.

AND WHY HAVEN'T THERE BEEN CHARGES

7

PRESSED AGAINST YOU?.

8

MR. MORGAN:

9

KNOWLEDGE OF THE WITNESS.

10
11

THE COURT:

14

BEYOND THE PERSONAL

AS PHRASED.

YOU CAN ANSWER THE QUESTION, IF YOU

KNOW.

12
12

OBJECTION.

THE WITNESS:
Q.

I DON'T KNOW..

YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE!:' T BE

CHARGED BECAUSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE?

15

A.

YES. I DON'T KNOW..

16

Q.

YOU DON'T KNOW.

YOUR WERE IN COURT FOR A

17

PRELIMINARY HEARING, WEREN'T YOU?

AND DIDN'T YOU HEAR

18

THE PROSECUTOR REFRESENT TO YOU THAT THEY WOULD NOT FILE

19

CHARGES AGAINST YOU?

FOR YOUR TESTIMONY?

20

A.

I CAN'T REMEMBER.

21

Q.

ISN'T THAT WHAT HAPPENED?

22
23
24
25

MR. MORGAN:

OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR.

MAY WE

APPROACH THE BENCH?
THE COURT:

YOU MAY.
{BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE

45

< r ^ '

fijta^c*—!

RECORD.)..
Q.

{BY MR. GRINDSTAFF)

NOW, HAVE YOU BEEN TOLD

THAT IF YOU DIDN'T TESTIMONY THAT YOU WOULD GO TO JAIL?
A.

NO.

Q.

NO?

ABOUT A MONTH AND A HALF AGO, WASN'T IT

TRUE THAT YOU AND YOUR SISTER SAT IN A ROOM WITH A POLICE
OFFICER AND YOU TWO WERE TOLD THAT IF YOU DIDN'T COME
OVE? AND TESTIFY AGAINST TOM
MR. MORGAN:

—

OBJECTION.

THIS IS GETTING

ARGUMENTATIVE AND -- I MEAN, HE'S ASKED —

EACH TIME THE

TIE WITNESS HAS ANSWERED EACH TIME THAT HE HAS NOT BFEN
OFFERED ANYTHING IN THIS CASE.

NOW WE ARE GOING THROUGH

TESTIMONY, I THINK, THAT IS GOING WAY COLLATERAL TO AIT
IrS"-S KEFE.
THE COURT:

WELL, I'M GOING TO OVERRULE THE

"•P-E-T^ ,' 0" T-r PRESUMPTION THAT A THE QUESTION IS ASKED
-- G";?r FATTH.
w:,,!

5"?^ 0" THE JURY. Y~U ?EME"BER WHEN THE JURY

cs-cr-^rv

pprr

r S S UAS GOING Oil, AND I INDICATED TO YOU

T-AT WHAT COUNSEL SAYS IS NOT EVIDENCE.
FV7--MT

I?

;juAT WITNESSES SAY.

THE OT*Lv

THE MERE FACT TKA"* *

2UESTICN IS AS^ED IN SUCK A WAY THAT IT MAY SOUND L T F A
STATEJisir FRO:: C O U N S E L , I S T H A T I S N O T E V I D E N C E , A N D r
CAUTION YOU TO CONSIDER THAT AS WE PROCEED.
THE OBJECTION IS OVERRULED.

YOU KAY PROCEED.

4S

1
2

Q.

(BY MR. GRIKDSTAFF)

DO YOV PFM^'-'F-? T-F

QUESTION?

3

A.

YES, I DO?

4

A.

NO..

5

Q.

NO?

6

A.

DID YOU SIT IN THE ROOM WITH YOUP. SI STEP A"?

7

POLICE OFFICERS?

8

A.

NO.

9

Q.

YOU NEVER SAT WITH ANY KIND OF POLICE

10

INVESTIGATOR WITH YOUR SISTER?

11

A.

NO, I DIDN'T.

12

Q.

THIS V7AS BEFORE PRELIMINARY HEARING?

13

APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO, YOU NEVER SAT—

14

A.

NO, I DIDN'T.

15

Q.

SO IF YOUR SISTER CAME IN AND TESTIFIED

16

DIFFERENTLY, THAT WOULDN'T BE TRUE?

17

A.

NO.

18

Q.

NOW, YOU MENTIONED THAT TOM SAID THAT YOU

19

WEREN'T SUPPOSED TO MENTION HIS NAME.

20

A.

YES.

21

Q.

YOU SAID THAT HE IMMEDIATELY TOLD YOU, DON'T

22

MENTION HIS NAME WHEN YOU CASH THE CHECK.

23

A CHECK, WHY WOULD YOU MENTION HIS NAME?

24
25

A.

WHEN YOU CASH

IF YOUR GOING INTO CASH A CHECK?

I DON'T GET

IT.
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